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In this article, we focus on two new provisions addressing the taxation of income from 
mobile capital, which were passed as part of Public Law 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act or TCJA) in December 2017. The provision on “global intangible low taxed 
income” (GILTI), which is set forth in new section 951A, is intended to make mobile capital, 
and the taxable income attributable to such capital, less sensitive to tax rate differentials between 
the United States and other jurisdictions vying for such capital. 1  To achieve that goal, the 
provision taxes U.S. taxpayers’ “mobile income” reported outside the United States when the 
foreign tax rate on the income falls below a minimum threshold.  
While the GILTI provision is intended as the proverbial stick, the provision known by its 
(less catchy) acronym “FDII” is the accompanying carrot. The provision on FDII —which stands 
for “foreign derived intangible income,” set forth in new Section 250, is intended to motivate 
both U.S. and foreign multinationals to locate within the United States the mobile income 
generated from the supply of goods, services, or intangible property that is ultimately used or 
consumed outside the United States.2  
The reactions of foreign governments and commentators to the international tax 
provisions of the TCJA suggest that these provisions (together with the lower corporate tax rate) 
make the United States more competitive for investment.3 Some European Union governments 
have signaled concern that the U.S. provisions may undermine the international system shaped 
by the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. 4 , 5  Similarly, European 
commentary points out the U.S.’s improved attractiveness as an investment location relative to 
European countries, particularly high-tax-rate countries like Germany. 6  In contrast, the 
commentary on such provisions in the United States has been mixed. In particular, some have 
criticized the GILTI provision as not being punitive enough to achieve the desired deterrence and 
the FDII provision as not providing a strong enough incentive for companies to retain mobile 
investments in the United States.7 Critics have also claimed that the provisions create incentives 
to locate new investments in tangible assets overseas.8 In particular, and at least on the surface, 
the design of the two provisions appears to leave open a tax arbitrage opportunity for companies 
 
1  Committee Print, Reconciliation Recommendations Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 71, S. Prt. 115-20, 
(December 2017), p. 370. 
2 Id. at 375. 
3 Mindy Herzfeld, Competition or Coordination: Responses to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX NOTES, 
(Jan. 16, 2018). 
4 Id. 
5 Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Commission Mulls ‘All Options’ in Wake of Final U.S. Tax Bill, TAX 
NOTES, (Jan. 1, 2018).  
6 Friedrich Heinemann et al., Analysis of US Corporate Tax Reform Proposals and their Effects for Europe 
and Germany, 18 (ZEW - Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Dec. 2017). 
7 David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on the Conference Committee Tax Bill, 103 
MINN L. REV. (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423 [https://perma.cc/38WS-
GLDL]. 
8 Id. 
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to pursue. Given this, it also appears to have left open an incentive for competing governments to 
offer even lower corporate income tax rates to attract investment.  
In this article, we analyze the effect of the two provisions on the incentives for the 
location of new investment by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs). In order to do so, we 
discuss the policy goal of the provisions and how the design of the provisions intends to achieve 
their policy goals in an environment that has been shaped by the OECD’s BEPS project.9 Our 
analysis suggests that U.S. MNCs may have strong incentives to locate new investments in 
intangible capital in the United States. Further, the provisions do not necessarily significantly 
sway the location choice for new investments in tangible capital away from the United States.  
The article is organized as follows. Section II lays out a basic framework to understand 
the taxation of capital income and its different components. Section III describes GILTI and 
FDII and identifies the underlying policy intent by reference to the framework introduced in 
Section II. The implications of the post-BEPS international tax system are discussed in this 
section as well. In particular, we highlight how non-tax “transaction costs” associated with the 
location of mobile capital in tax-advantaged jurisdictions have increased post-BEPS and how this 
can influence the cost-benefit calculus underlying firms’ investment location decisions. Section 
IV analyzes the GILTI and FDII provisions’ effects on investment location decisions of U.S. 
MNCs and examines the validity of the different concerns expressed about these provisions. 
Section V concludes.   
II. TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 
A business’s expected return on an investment can be viewed as comprising two 
elements. The first is the rate of return available on comparable investments in competitive 
capital markets. This “normal” rate of return is the opportunity cost of the investment. For an 
investment to be worth undertaking, its expected cash flows, discounted at the normal rate of 
return, must not be negative.10 The second potential element in a firm’s expected return is the 
return in excess of its opportunity cost. Such “above normal” returns are usually taken to 
represent economic rents attributable to one or more unique attributes of the firm.11  
The structure of a tax determines whether it taxes only economic rents (or “above 
normal” returns) or whether it also taxes the normal rate of return. Because economic rents are 
by definition over and above the return necessary to justify the investment, a tax on them does 
not distort the decision to invest or the level of such investment. In a world without capital 
mobility, a uniform tax on economic rents across sectors and asset classes is efficient because it 
imposes no distortion on the overall level of investment and how such investment is allocated 
across sectors and asset types. However, when economic rents are mobile (i.e. are not “location-
 
9 We express no opinion on the sustainability of these provisions against possible challenge by foreign 
governments or multilateral organizations under various international agreements. 
10 When dealing with a risky investment, the opportunity cost should contain a return for risk bearing (risk 
premium) over and above the risk-free return necessary to induce delayed consumption. 
11 Again, in the case of risky investments, ex-post results above the (ex-ante) normal rate of return may 
simply be the realization of chance rather than rents. 
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specific”), the location of capital is sensitive to taxes, even if the level of such capital is not.12 
Such mobile rents typically stem from firm-specific attributes, such as unique intangibles that 
can give the firm a degree of monopoly power.  
In our framework we consider a one-dollar investment that starts to generate income one 
period later.13 The total pre-tax amount (i.e., gross-of-depreciation return) GRt expected to be 
generated by the investment in any future period t is given by Equation 1 below, where Rt 
denotes the normal return, ERt denotes the economic rent. and Dt represents economic 
depreciation.  
Equation 1 
𝐺𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 
Assume that the expected rates of return associated with the investment in question are 
constant over time with the normal rate denoted by r and the rate of economic rents denoted by 
er. Using Kt to denote the net capital stock from the original investment carried into the current 
period, the dollar amount of the normal return in any given period t is r times Kt. In turn, Kt 
equals one in the period immediately following the period in which the investment is made. For 
all subsequent periods, Kt is given by Equation 2.
14 
Equation 2 




Similarly, the dollar amount of the economic rents in period t is given by er times Kt. 
Given the above, the total pre-tax gross return from the investment in any period t is given by 
Equation 3.  
Equation 3 
𝐺𝑅𝑡 = 𝑟𝐾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝐾𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 
We now consider a tax code that allows for immediate expensing of the investment at a 
tax rate of τ and then levies a tax at the same rate on the subsequent gross returns (gross-of-
depreciation return).15 A well-known property of a tax code that permits immediate expensing of 
 
12 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE 
MIRRLEES REVIEW, (James Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010). 
13 See generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (“OECD”), OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 16: 
Fundamental Reform of Corporate Income Tax, OECD (2007). For now, we do not distinguish between tangible and 
intangible capital. For simplicity, we assume that the investment is entirely equity financed.  
14 The capital stock will converge to zero under alternative assumptions with regard to depreciation that are 
standard in such analyses including linear depreciation (i.e., straight line schedule) as well as a constant rate of 
decay (i.e., geometric schedule).  
15 The present discounted value of the after-tax stream of gross returns (gross-of-depreciation return) (i.e., 
before subtracting out the upfront cost of the investment) is given by the expression: τ+t=1(rKt+erKt+Dt)1-τ(1+r)t. 
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capital investments is that such a tax system exempts the normal return from tax.16 The tax 
benefit that the firm realizes from expensing fully offsets — in present value terms — the 
subsequent tax the firm pays on the investment’s normal rate of return and the portion of the 
gross income that covers the depreciation of the investment. The expected stream of the normal 
returns generated from an investment along with the portion of returns that pay for its 
depreciation when discounted at the investment’s opportunity cost — i.e., normal rate of return 
— must, by definition, equal the original investment.17  Thus, a tax benefit on that original 
investment must equate (in expected terms) to the tax payments on the normal rate plus 
economic depreciation so long as the tax rate remains unchanged over time.  
Note that the above does not imply that the government stands to collect zero tax 
revenues under expensing when there are no rents to tax. Even when economic rents are entirely 
absent, the total undiscounted tax revenues received by the government would exceed the initial 
tax benefit of expensing; the government would earn the normal rate of return on the initial tax 
benefit it offered. Under expensing, the government effectively becomes a silent partner in the 
investment —it defrays a share of the firm’s upfront cost and receives the same share of the 
subsequent returns.18  
When the tax code does not allow for immediate expensing, and instead only permits a 
deduction equal to the economic depreciation of the investment (or a proxy for such depreciation 
based on a tax depreciation schedule), the normal rate of return from such investments bears a 
tax burden.19, 20, 21 
There are sound policy reasons to exempt the normal return from tax, in order to avoid 
the efficiency cost of having a distorted level of investment that is below the optimal level. With 
the new rules allowing for 100 percent expensing for certain qualified tangible business assets (at 
least through 2022) under section 168(k), as amended by 13201 of the TCJA, the normal return 
on new investments in those assets is exempt from tax.  Other things equal, this can stimulate 
 
The first term in the expression represents the tax gain in the first period from the immediate expensing of the 
investment, while the second term is the present discounted value of the stream of gross returns after tax. 
16 See OECD., supra note 13. 
17 A mathematical proof is available from the authors upon request.  
18 With risky returns, the loss offset rules are important. With less than full loss offset, the government falls 
short of being a true silent partner because it does not participate symmetrically in the upside and downside 
realizations of the risk. Although the change in loss offset rules are an important consideration in the context of P.L. 
115-97, we ignore this change in the interest of tractability.  
19 A mathematical exposition of this within the framework adopted in this section is available from the 
authors upon request.  
20 If the tax depreciation schedule replicates true economic depreciation, the normal rate of return bears the 
full extent of the tax. A tax schedule that allows for slower depreciation than the true economic rate imposes a tax on 
the normal return at a rate greater than the statutory rate.  
21 The tax burden on the normal return means that the investment would only be undertaken if the economic 
rents are sufficient to ensure that the one dollar investment generates at least its opportunity cost on an after-tax 
basis. If the economic rents generated by an investment decline for each additional dollar of investment, the scale of 
investment under full expensing will be greater than under a system that only allows for deductibility of the 
depreciation. Under the framework adopted in this section, this would be the case when the constant rate of 
economic rents (er) assumed for the marginal dollar of investment is a declining function of the scale of 
inframarginal investment. 
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investment. 22  With immediate expensing already applying to investments in self-developed 
intangibles, such as research and development, advertising and marketing, the normal return on 
such investments should also be exempt from U.S. tax.23 
Other things equal, the expensing rules would prevent U.S. tax from distorting the level 
of investments in different classes of business assets. On their own, however, the expensing rules 
do not address concerns related to the location of such investments. As long as the economic 
rents from such investments are subject to U.S. tax, differences in the rates of such tax between 
the U.S. and other jurisdictions can motivate firms to locate their investments overseas. While 
tax is only one consideration among many and some forms of capital are more mobile than 
others, the reality of tax competition suggests that taxes are important with regard to the 
investment location. 24  
Above-normal profits from intangibles represent the most mobile form of economic rents 
in an international tax context. Furthermore, the cross-border mobility of such rents can take one 
of two forms. One form is where the “economic activity” underlying such income – to adopt the 
BEPS parlance of the OECD – is located in a tax-advantaged jurisdiction along with the 
concomitant taxable income.25 The other type of cross-border mobility – again, adopting the 
OECD parlance – is of the “artificial” kind where it is only the taxable income that moves to a 
low-tax jurisdiction without the corresponding location of the underlying economic activity (i.e., 
“substance”) in that jurisdiction.26 It is the mobility of the “artificial” kind that has been the focus 
of the BEPS project. As such, new measures and guidance specifically aimed at curtailing such 
separation of taxable income from the underlying economic activity that gives rise to such 
income in the context of intangible capital constitute a significant part of the project’s output.27 
As discussed by the authors previously and further below, the result of this is that there are now 
higher non-tax transaction costs of locating mobile capital away from jurisdictions that, absent 
tax considerations, would be the natural home for such capital. 28  It is in this post-BEPS 
environment that the GILTI and FDII provisions are intended to narrow, and possibly eliminate, 
tax-rate arbitrage on mobile rents.  
 
22 Note that this applies to equity-financed investments in qualified assets. With debt financing – and 
subject to the rules of I.R.C. § 163(j) – the effective tax on the normal return on such assets may be negative.  
23 However, the earlier caveat regarding imperfect loss rules, supra note 18, may be of particular relevance 
here.  
24 Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions, 10 INT’L TAX 
AND PUB. FIN., 107-26 (2003). 
25 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 10 (OECD Publ’g, 2013) (stating that 
“[n]o or low taxation is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with practices that 
artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it.” 
26 Id. See also OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, ACTIONS 8-10 – 
2015 FINAL REPORTS (OECD Publ’g, 2015).  
27  OECD, supra note 25, at 20. In particular, among the objectives covered by Action 8 was the 
development of rules to ensure “that profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately 
allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from) value creation . . . .” 
28  Kartikeya Singh & Aparna Mathur, Economic Substance Requirements and Multinational Firm 
Behavior, (Am. Enter. Inst. Econ., Working Paper No. 2017-02, 2017).  
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Before we turn to those provisions, we make two additional observations. An important 
distinction between expensing and depreciation is reflected in what constitutes taxable income in 
any given period when such taxable income is attributable to a prior investment. With immediate 
expensing, the taxable income (Y) resulting from one dollar of investment is -1 in the period 
during which the investment is made. For any period t after the original period of investment, the 
taxable income is given by Equation 4 and includes the element of the gross return that pays for 
the economic depreciation of the investment.  
Equation 4 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑟𝐾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝐾𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 
In contrast, under depreciation, the taxable income in period t attributable to a one-dollar 
investment made in the past is given by Equation 5. 
Equation 5 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑟𝐾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝐾𝑡 
As described earlier, if the ongoing depreciation (or normal return) of an investment were 
not taxed under an expensing regime, or if such depreciation (or normal return) were taxed at a 
rate lower than the rate at which the original investment was expensed, the effective tax on the 
normal rate of return would be negative in present value terms. The opposite is true – i.e., the 
normal return bears a positive tax even with expensing – when the subsequent taxation of the 
normal return (or depreciation) takes place at a rate higher than the original expensing.  
So far, we have not differentiated between investments in intangible capital and 
investments in tangible capital. However, a common assumption is that economic rents are 
usually generated by intangible assets. Further, the economic rents attributable to intangible 
capital are far more mobile (at least from an income tax reporting standpoint) than any rents on 
tangible capital.  
Finally, we note that the rules of most OECD countries allow expensing for investments in 
research and development and marketing aimed at generating self-developed intangibles.29 In 
contrast (and prior to the enactment of the TCJA), most OECD countries only allowed for a tax 
deduction for the depreciation of most forms of tangible capital.30 We now turn to the GILTI and 
FDII provisions and describe their policy objectives in the context of the framework presented 
here. 
III. TAXING MOBILE INCOME VIA GILTI AND FDII 
A. GILTI 
Section 951A of the Code lays out the rules for GILTI and requires that a U.S. 
corporation include in its taxable income currently the “global intangible low-taxed income” of 
 
29 Kyle Pomerleau, Capital Cost Recovery across the OECD, 402 TAX FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT (2013). 
30 Id. 
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all its controlled foreign corporations (CFCs).31 However, section 250 provides a deduction equal 
to 50 percent of this income.32 With a 21 percent tax rate, and absent any foreign taxes (as well 
as other limitations), a U.S. corporation will be subject to a 10.5 percent tax rate on the total 
GILTI of its CFCs.  
GILTI is calculated in the aggregate for a given U.S. corporation across all of its CFCs 
(in proportion to the US shareholder’s equity interest in each such CFC) and excludes income 
already subject to U.S. tax (such as ECI and Subpart F income) (as well as certain other exempt 
categories of income). Roughly speaking, a CFC’s income subject to U.S. tax under the GILTI 
provision is an estimate of its overall income from business operations less a “deemed tangible 
income return.”33  The deemed tangible return equals 10 percent of the CFC’s tax basis in 
depreciable tangible business assets; that tax basis, which is determined under the section 168(g) 
alternative depreciation schedule, is termed “Qualified Business Asset Investment” (QBAI).34  
Finally, the U.S. shareholder is allowed foreign tax credits for the shareholder’s 
proportionate share of 80 percent of the CFC’s foreign income taxes that are allocable to the 
GILTI portion of the CFC’s income.35 The GILTI rule thereby ensures a minimum rate of tax on 
a U.S. shareholder’s CFC. In the absence of any foreign taxes, the CFC will be subject to a U.S. 
tax at the rate of 10.5 percent on its deemed intangible income with all its routine return 
attributable to tangible property (as proxied by 10 percent of its QBAI) being shielded from any 
U.S. tax. With a positive foreign tax rate, the effective rate of U.S. tax relating to the GILTI 
provision is generally lower than 10.5 percent due to foreign tax credits.  
B. FDII 
While the GILTI provision seeks to deter tax planning that offshores investments aimed 
at generating income from foreign consumption or use of property, services or IP, the 
complementary FDII rules seek to provide an incentive for U.S. corporations to locate such 
investments and income in the United States. Under section 250, a U.S. corporation is “allowed 
as a deduction” 37.5 percent of that portion of its taxable income that is categorized as foreign 
derived intangible income. 36 That results in an effective tax rate of 13.125 percent on FDII, as 
62.5 percent of such income is subject to the 21 percent U.S. tax rate.37 
The computation of a U.S. corporation’s FDII requires steps conceptually similar to the 
calculation of GILTI. Starting with the U.S. corporation’s gross income, its total “deduction 
eligible income” is derived by excluding any income that is already subject to U.S. tax (such as 
Subpart F income and GILTI) and certain other forms of income (e.g., dividends received from 
 
31 I.R.C. §951A.  
32 For years 2026 and later, this deduction is limited to 21.875 percent.  I.R.C §250(a)(3).  
33 I.R.C. §951A(b)(1).  
34 I.R.C. §951A(b)(2), I.R.C. §168(g). 
35 Note that the GILTI computation starts with an after-tax figure and thus make the tax rules of the CFC’s 
country, including its capital allowance rules, relevant to the GILTI amount. The final amount subject to U.S. tax 
under the GILTI provision is a pre-tax (i.e., taxable income equivalent) figure by way of the I.R.C. § 78 “gross ups”.  
36 For years 2026 and later, this deduction is limited to 21.875 percent. I.R.C §250(a)(3).  
37 Absent potential limitations on foreign tax credits under I.R.C §904 that result from expense allocation 
rules of I.R.C §861.  
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CFCs, domestic oil and gas income, foreign branch income and financial services income) and 
then subtracting deductions (including taxes) properly allocable to such gross income.38 
From the deduction-eligible income, a “deemed tangible income return” equal to 10 
percent times the corporation’s QBAI, is subtracted to determine the “deemed intangible 
income.”39 Finally, the FDII is that portion of the deemed intangible income that is attributable to 
sales of products, provision of services, licenses of IP, etc. for foreign consumption or use.40  
C. Policy Intent of GILTI and FDII 
Recall from Section II the policy challenge of taxing economic rents in an open economy. 
While exempting the normal return from capital taxation serves the goal of an undistorted level 
of investment, a government is susceptible to losing investment when it seeks to tax the 
economic rents and a competing government offers a lower tax rate. The challenge is greater 
when the economic rents in question come from (or can be attributed to) mobile forms of capital 
such as intangible assets.  
A policymaker tasked with designing international tax rules to address the challenge 
posed by mobile economic rents would ideally want to first identify such economic rents within 
a taxpayer’s overall taxable income. Using our expressions for taxable income from Equation 4 
and Equation 5, the portion of a company’s taxable income targeted by such rules should be er 
times that portion of Kt that is made up of intangible capital (under the assumption that intangible 
capital is mobile and tangible capital is not). However, parsing a firm’s observed taxable income 
between normal returns and economic rents (and between tangible capital and intangible capital) 
in an objective manner is a significant measurement problem in practical policy design. The 
problem is tougher still when the reported taxable income across different jurisdictions has been 
computed under different capital allowances (e.g., expensing or depreciation deduction for a 
capital expenditure) and other tax rules.  
If we view the GILTI and FDII provisions as an attempt to identify mobile rents, it is 
clear that their drafters made certain assumptions and compromises. They assumed that 10 
percent is a reasonable proxy for the normal rate of return in nominal terms and that tangible 
capital generally earns no more than a normal rate of return. Assuming minimal rents to tangible 
capital, subtracting a 10 percent return on tangible capital from taxable income would, under a 
specific combination of capital allowance rules for the two classes of investment, isolate the 
returns to intangible capital.41 This would still leave the normal return on intangibles (as well as 
the portion of the return covering economic depreciation) in the mix but that is not a problem 
under full expensing of intangible investments. However, as we discuss below, in other situations 
the design of the provisions will not be able to selectively target economic rents.42  
In this setup, the GILTI provision is the backstop that ensures that a certain portion of the 
returns to mobile capital of U.S.MNCs remain in the U.S. tax base even when such returns are 
reported in low-tax foreign jurisdictions (via subsidiaries located in those jurisdictions). Further, 
 
38 I.R.C §250(b).  
39 I.R.C §250(b)(2)(B). 
40 I.R.C §250(b)(4)  
41 Specifically, this would be the case where full and immediate expensing applies for investments in 
intangible property but only depreciation is allowed for investments in tangible capital. 
42 See Sections IV.C and IV.D.  
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by serving as such a backstop, the GILTI rules can help lower the incentive and ability of foreign 
jurisdictions to engage in tax competition to attract investment from U.S. MNCs.43  
And yet, while the rules on GILTI and FDII reduce the benefit that U.S. MNCs can 
expect from locating mobile capital (and the rents attributable to such capital) in low-tax 
jurisdictions, they do not entirely eliminate such benefit. At least on the surface, the rules appear 
to leave open a tax-rate arbitrage window for mobile rents (albeit, a window that is smaller than 
before). For U.S. MNCS, simplified like-for-like comparison of the marginal U.S. tax burden on 
mobile rents generated from an investment (targeted at supplying non-U.S. markets) suggests 
that this marginal tax can be no lower than 13.125 percent when located in the United States but 
can be as low as 10.5 percent when located in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction (other things equal 
and ignoring other tax attributes specific to each jurisdiction). Given the dividend received 
deduction (DRD) under the TCJA,44 this means that an incentive to offshore rent-generating 
mobile capital may still exist among U.S. MNCs. Jurisdictions may then continue to try and 
attract investments of U.S. MNCs through tax competition (e.g. IP box regimes, lower tax rates, 
etc.). If this is indeed the case, an opportunity would appear to have been lost from the 
perspective of the U.S. treasury.  
D. Impact of BEPS 
In this section, we show that while such a tax arbitrage may exist, non-tax transaction 
costs related to BEPS may narrow, and even eliminate, this gap. Locating mobile rents in a tax-
advantaged jurisdiction takes more than just a reallocation of “paper profits” for income tax 
purposes and often requires some measure of change in a business’s operations (such as location 
of employees, ways of dealing with outside parties, etc.). For profits reported in a jurisdiction to 
be respected for income tax purposes, the international tax rules require that such reported profits 
be supported by sufficient “economic substance.”45 Absent the requisite economic substance, the 
company’s cross-border allocation of taxable income is unlikely to be respected and the effective 
tax on such profits will not be lowered.46 In turn, economic substance – in the context of mobile 
rent-generating capital such as intangible property (IP) – effectively amounts to observable 
economic activity in the form of employees that are responsible for performing important 
functions that have a bearing on the profit-making potential of the relevant IP. To the extent that 
the United States is the “natural home” of such economic substance for a U.S. MNC in a world 
without tax considerations – for instance, on account of linkages and network economies with 
 
43 The incentives of jurisdictions offering lower tax rates to attract rents from mobile forms of capital have 
only been heightened with the OECD’s BEPS project and the greater substance requirements for cross-border 
related-party allocations of intangible-related income to be respected. With a higher substance threshold, a 
government offering lower tax rates on intangible income not only stands to attract more taxable income but also 
more real economic activity, such as jobs.   
See Kartikeya Singh &Aparna Mathur BEPS and the Law of Unintended Consequences, TAX NOTES (TA) 
(Sept. 16, 2013). 
44 I.R.C §245A.  
45 OECD, supra note 26, at 3. 
46 Id. at 13, 38. 
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other aspects of the company’s business – locating the requisite economic substance in a low-tax 
jurisdiction will come at an incremental cost. Such incremental non-tax costs for the firm would 
be present to the extent it has to organize its business affairs (e.g., such as the location of its 
employees and their roles and responsibilities) differently from how it would do so in a no-tax 
world. Any such non-tax costs then represent a leakage from the tax benefit the firm may 
generate from its investment location choice.  
The non-tax transaction costs related to international tax planning may be higher still on 
account of additional compliance and administrative burdens that a U.S. MNC might face when 
locating rent-generating capital outside of the United States for tax considerations. The 
additional compliance and administrative burdens can come from having to defend its location 
choice of IP – a choice that may have the appearance of having been made specifically for tax 
purposes – to revenue authorities of different jurisdictions that may have an interest in 
challenging the company’s position in order to appropriate a greater share of tax revenues.  
It is fair to say that the transaction costs related to international tax planning that a firm 
faces are higher in the post-BEPS world than before. From the outset of the BEPS project, the 
OECD had identified intangibles – as the quintessential form of mobile capital that can be moved 
across jurisdictions relatively easily – as a key area where new rules and a tightening of existing 
rules was needed to curb the ability of multinationals to “artificially” shift profits from high-tax 
to low-tax jurisdictions.47  Correspondingly, the OECD devoted a significant part of its new 
guidelines, presented in the report on BEPS Actions 8 through 10, to intangibles and the cross-
border allocation of taxable income attributable to such intangibles. 48  The new guidelines 
reinforced the concept of “economic substance” as a way to ensure that whenever a taxpayer 
asserts a jurisdiction as its location for important intangibles (and taxable income attributable to 
them), it has to show that it meets a necessary and elevated precondition: the location of 
employees necessary for the development, management, and exploitation of the intangibles 
within that same jurisdiction.49 This is intended to minimize (if not entirely eliminate) “artificial 
profit shifting” where the location of income attributed to a company’s intangibles is 
disassociated from the location of important people functions.50 In effect, the revised guidelines 
and standards impose a significant transaction cost on firms’ international tax planning built 
around the location of intangible capital.  
So, how do the new rules on FDII and GILTI impact the decision margins of U.S. MNCs 
with regard to new investments in an international tax environment shaped by BEPS? 
Commentary within the US has been mixed. Some commentators have argued that the provisions 
do not do enough to change the “offshoring problem” and recommend “equalizing the minimum 
tax rate on GILTI” and “the reduced rate on exports” to close the tax arbitrage window 
mentioned above, in particular citing a “tax haven problem”.51 Others have noted that the new 
rules do indeed reduce (although, without completely eliminating) the incentive to offshore 
investments and also point to the potential effect of GILTI being far more punitive than 
 
47 OECD, supra note 25, at 13. 
48 See OECD, supra note 26, at 63-92.   
49 Id. at 38-9. 
50 OECD, supra note 25, at 18.  
51 Kamin et al., supra note 7, at 56. 
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immediately apparent. 52 , 53  We turn to an analysis of the effects of the GILTI and FDII 
provisions on U.S. MNCs’ incentives with regard to the location of new investments. We 
explicitly incorporate into this analysis non-tax transaction costs that a firm may have to face 
when considering its location choice.  
IV. FIRM’S LOCATION CHOICE FOR NEW INVESTMENTS WITH GILTI AND FDII54 
To consider the impact of the provisions, we compare the after-tax net present value 
(NPV) and the internal rate of return (IRR) of a new investment when it is located within the 
United States to when it is located in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction. For simplicity, we assume 
that the investment generates income entirely from foreign consumption or use.  
We consider a new $10 million investment in year 0. Assuming an economic life of five years 
and constant straight-line depreciation, the investment starts depreciating in year 1 and is fully 
depreciated by the end of year 5.55 Further, the undepreciated portion of the investment starts to 
generate returns in year 1 with each year’s return being made up of two components: the normal 
return equal to 10 percent and economic rents at a rate of 20 percent. The total before-tax return 
is then 30 percent. The assumption of a high rate of economic rents is appropriate for the types of 
investment targeted by the GILTI and FDII rules. The pre-tax outlays, net capital stock and 
returns from the investment over its life cycle are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Before-Tax Outlays, Net Capital Stock and Returns 
(All figures in million USD) 
 
For now, we do not distinguish between investments in tangible and intangible capital, with each 
type analyzed separately below. Using Equation 4 and Equation 5, Table 2 shows the tax 
treatment of the investment in each year under expensing and depreciation.  
 
52 Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Where Will the Factories Go? A Preliminary Assessment, 158 
TAX NOTES 570 (Jan 29, 2018).  
53 Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: More GILTI than you thought, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L 587 (Feb. 
12, 2018).  
54 The analysis in this section ignores U.S. state taxes as well as foreign tax credit limitations when 
computing the U.S. tax on GILTI. 
55 For simplicity, all cost outlays and income are assumed to occur at the beginning of the year. Additionally, the tax 
depreciation schedule, when relevant, is assumed to conform to true economic depreciation. 
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Table 2: Taxable Income under Alternative Capital Allowance Regimes 
(All figures in million USD) 
 
Under the assumptions made for this hypothetical investment, taxable income under immediate 
expensing is identical to the before-tax cash flows. In contrast, with deductibility of depreciation, 
taxable income is the sum of the normal return and the economic rents. Consistent with the 
discussion in Section II, the expensing regime only imposes a tax on the economic rents in 
present value terms ($4.8 million) whereas the depreciation regime taxes both the normal return 
and the economic rents ($7.3 million). 
A. The Imputed Return in the GILTI and FDII Rules  
Before we proceed with our analysis of investment location, we make a slight digression 
regarding the normal rate of return. The imputed return on depreciable tangible assets (i.e., 
QBAI) set forth in the TCJA in the application of the GILTI and FDII provisions is an important 
design feature of GILTI and FDII rules and one that has not escaped comment. Views on this 
range from the 10 percent figure having been “pulled out of thin air” and therefore lacking any 
basis to it being too high “compared to similar provisions in the code, which set returns a few 
percentage points above the risk free return.”56 We have a different view on this issue. 
We conjecture that the imputed return on tangible assets chosen in the design of the 
GILTI and FDII provisions is a proxy for the normal rate of return attributable to tangible (and 
hence, relatively immobile) capital so as to isolate economic rents that accrue to more mobile 
capital. For equity-financed investments, the normal return is the required market rate of return 
on equity in the applicable risk class.57, 58 Without knowing the specifics of the taxpayer and the 
investment in question, a reasonable guess for this normal rate of return is the expected return on 
equity in the overall economy. If one were to use the past to derive an expectation of the future, 
 
56 Sullivan, supra note 52. See also Kamin et al., supra note 7 at 46.  
57  See Rachel Griffith et al., International Capital Taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE 
MIRRLEES REVIEW 914, 926 (James Mirrlees et al., eds., 2010). 
58  For debt-financed investments, the normal return is the market rate of interest on debt (which is 
subtracted out of the “net deemed tangible income return” under the GILTI and FDII rules since, with the 
deductibility of interest expense, this portion is already exempt from tax). I.R.C §951A(b)(2)(B). 
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10 percent is a close estimate of the average return on the S&P 500.59 This may be the thinking 
underlying the GILTI and FDII rules. In fact, the House Ways and Means Committee’s 
counterpart to the GILTI rules used a rate of seven percent plus a short-term federal interest 
rate.60 The seven percent figure is a close approximation of the excess of the average historical 
equity returns over the risk-free rate.61 The House and Ways and Means Committee proposal 
thus also appears to have used a similar imputed return in its equivalent to the GILTI provision 
as the historical annual return on equity for the S&P 500 (albeit through a slightly different 
route).  
The 10 percent imputed return in the GILTI and FDII provisions thus may not have been 
pulled out of thin air. That by itself fails to say whether it is in fact an appropriate figure to use as 
the imputed return in the provisions. To assess whether the 10 percent imputed return figure is 
appropriate in the context of its intended purpose –identifying the normal rate of return so as to 
exempt this (as hypothesized by us) under the GILTI provision – requires answering the 
following question: what discount rate would an (equity) investor use to present value the 
deductions from projected future taxable income that are available via the deemed tangible return 
income” (i.e., the imputed return on QBAI) under the provision?62 In particular, should the 
hypothetical investor use a relatively safe rate of return or one that incorporates an equity risk 
premium? The discount rate that the investor uses is what should be used as the imputed return 
so as to ensure the desired tax neutrality (i.e., specifically identifying the economic rents so as to 
leave the normal returns untaxed on a present value basis).63  
A relatively safe rate would be appropriate for the imputed return if the “deemed tangible 
return income” for a given year could be carried forward or back to offset the “tested income” 
amounts in other years so as to lower the GILTI amounts in those years. If this were the case, a 
U.S. MNC would almost be guaranteed the tax benefit of the imputed return. The only situation 
under which (an equity investor) in the U.S. MNC would stand to lose the benefit of the imputed 
return on QBAI would be where the relevant CFCs of the company never generate enough tested 
income for the investor to benefit from the imputed return on QBAI. The risk associated with 
such a situation is akin to that of bankruptcy (of the relevant CFCs). Thus, if the GILTI provision 
in the TCJA allowed a taxpayer to carry the “deemed tangible income return” forward to offset 
future GILTI liabilities, an investor would discount these future deductions at a rate equal to the 
risk-free rate plus a default risk premium. Taking administrative considerations into account, a 
rate equal to an average corporate borrowing rate would be reasonable proxy for the imputed 
 
59 See Michael Santoli, The S&P 500 Has Already Met Its Average Return for a Full Year, But Don't 
Expect It to Stay Here, CNBC, (June 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/18/the-sp-500-has-already-met-its-
average-return-for-a-full-year.html [https://perma.cc/8U6W-KR5Y]. 
60 Section 4310, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  
61 ROGER J. GRABOWSI ET AL., 2017 VALUATION HANDBOOK - U.S. GUIDE TO COST OF CAPITAL (2017).  
62 For the purposes of this discussion, we focus on the GILTI provisions, but the analogous reasoning 
applies to FDII provisions.  
63 The reasoning mirrors that used for purposes of determining the appropriate imputed return used in the 
allowance for corporate equity (ACE) rules adopted in certain countries.  The exemption of the normal return from 
tax is an objective for ACE rules (in addition to reducing distortions in debt versus equity financing decisions).  
See Griffith et al., supra note 57, at 977-78. 
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return in the provision. This would not be too different from what some commentators have 
opined that the 10 percent imputed return is too high.64  
However, the above applies only if the GILTI rules were to allow carryforward of 
“excess” deemed tangible return income amounts to shield tested income, and thereby reduce 
GILTI, in other years. This is not the case in the actual design of the GILTI provision. The 
GILTI amount is lower in any given year by the 10 percent imputed return on QBAI when the 
"tested income" for the U.S. MNC’s CFCs exceeds this imputed amount. However, in the 
situation where the 10 percent imputed return exceeds the tested income amount, the GILTI 
amount subject to US tax for that year, other things equal, is zero. But the excess of the imputed 
return over the tested income does not carry forward to shield tested income amounts in future 
years nor can it be carried back. Instead the value of this deduction is limited to the specific year 
in question and is tied to the realization of the uncertain return in that year.65  This implies that 
the discount rate an investor would use to calculate the present value of the imputed income on 
the QBAI cannot be a safe rate of return since this deduction is not guaranteed.  In turn, this 
means that the appropriate discount rate the equity investor should apply to calculate the present 
value of this deduction cannot be too far removed from the discount rate that would apply to 
calculate present value of the uncertain return. The expected rate of return on equity is therefore 
not far off from an appropriate candidate for this discount rate. Correspondingly, the same rate of 
return as the imputed return in the provision may not be too far off the mark.  Certainly, a safe 
rate of return would not be an appropriate choice for this imputed return.   
With this slight digression on the normal rate of return out of the way we now turn to the 
analysis of the location choice of our candidate investment described earlier in the section. 
B. Intangible Capital66 
For intangible capital, the tax treatment given by column (H) in Table 2 is assumed to 
apply, regardless of the location of the investment. As discussed above, the tax codes of most 
jurisdictions, including the United States, currently allow immediate expensing of most 
investments in self-developed intangibles.67 Because the expensed investment has zero tax basis, 
the QBAI for purposes of GILTI and FDII is zero in each year.  
If the U.S. MNC locates this investment in the United States, it would benefit from the 
FDII rules. Its total tax liability in years 0 through 5 is shown in Table 3.  
 
64 Kamin et al., supra note 7, at 46. 
65 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.951A-(1)(c)(3)(i)1, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,072, 51,093 (Oct. 10, 2018) (defining “net 
deemed tangible income return” with respect to a “United States shareholder and a U.S. shareholder inclusion 
amount means with respect to a United States shareholder and a U.S. shareholder inclusion year, the excess (if any) 
of—(A) (t)he shareholder’s deemed tangible income return ... for the year, over, (B) (t)he shareholder’s specified 
interest expense … for the year.”) (emphasis added). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.951A-(1)(c)(3)(ii), 83 Fed. Reg. 
51,072, 51,093 (Oct. 10, 2018) (defining “deemed tangible income return” with respect to a United States 
shareholder as “10 percent of the aggregate of the shareholder’s pro rata share of the qualified business asset 
investment ... of each tested income CFC for the year.”) (emphasis added). 
66 For a comparison of the United States with other jurisdictions with regard to tax incentives for research-
based intangible investments, see Andrew Lyon & William A. McBride, Assessing US Global Tax Competitiveness 
after Tax Reform (paper presented to Nat. Tax Ass’n 2018 Spring Symposium, Washington, DC, May 17, 2018). 
67 For the U.S., this will change for certain types of research and engineering expenses after 2022 when 
such expenses will have to be amortized for tax purposes over five years. I.R.C. §174 modified with effect for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 2021 pursuant to I.R.C. §174(e) introduced in P.L. 115-97.  
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Table 3: Total Tax Liability when Locating Intangible Investment in the United States68 
(All figures in million USD) 
 
In the table, column (J) represents the regular tax liability of the firm in the absence of FDII rules 
and is simply the taxable income shown in column (H) of Table 2 multiplied by the U.S. tax rate 
of 21 percent. Column (K) shows the amount of income that is characterized as FDII.69 Because 
the investment only generates income derived from foreign use and has zero tax basis, the FDII 
corresponds to the taxable income in each year. Column (L) denotes the tax benefit of the FDII 
deduction, which equals 37.5 percent of each year’s FDII multiplied by the 21 percent U.S. tax 
rate. Finally, column (M) shows the firm’s total tax liability (inclusive of the tax benefit 
conferred by FDII) as the sum of columns (J) and (L). In this example, over the specific new 
investment’s entire life cycle, the tax liability equals $0.6 million in present value terms. Absent 
the FDII rules, and given expensing of the investment, the U.S. government would be a silent 
partner in the entire investment. This means that the normal rate of return from the investment 
would go untaxed (in present value terms) but all the economic rents would be taxed at the 21 
percent rate. With the FDII rules, the U.S. government is a silent partner in only 62.5 percent of 
the investment. The normal rate of return still remains untaxed and, in addition, now 37.5 percent 
of the firm’s economic rents are also exempted from U.S. tax. This is the impact of the FDII 
carrot.  
Now, suppose that the MNC has the choice of locating this investment in a zero-tax 
foreign jurisdiction. Doing so will subject the firm to the GILTI rules. The firm’s total tax 
liability in years 0 through 5 is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Total Tax Liability when Locating Intangible Investment Overseas 
 
68 Negative FDII tax benefit figures imply a reduction in U.S. tax liability.  
69 The investment outlay in year 0, and the immediate expensing of such investment for tax purposes, 
means that the deduction reduces the FDII generated from investments of older vintages.  Said differently, as long as 
the firm has income from investments made in years prior to year zero (which is labeled as such specifically in 
relation to the current investment), and the FDII associated with such older investments would have been greater 
than $10 million (but for the current investment), the marginal impact of the current investment on the firm’s FDII 
in year 0 is -$10 million.   
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(All figures in million USD) 
 
Column (N) lists the zero foreign tax liability. Column (O) shows the amount of the taxable 
income classified as GILTI, which equals all the foreign pre-tax income because the investment 
has zero tax basis and does not give rise to QBAI. The negative taxable income under GILTI in 
year 0 assumes that this offsets GILTI income elsewhere at the level of the relevant U.S. 
corporate shareholder thereby allowing us to analyze the marginal impact of this investment 
location decision.70, 71 Column (P) shows that the U.S. tax is 10.5 percent of the gross returns. 
The GILTI rules combined with the section 250 deduction that applies to a U.S. shareholder’s 
GILTI income, positions the U.S. government as a silent partner in 50 percent of the firm’s 
investment – the government effectively allows immediate expensing of 50 percent of the 
overseas investment and then taxes 50 percent of the gross returns.72 The firm’s tax liability – all 
of which is on account of GILTI – is exactly half of what it would be if it located this investment 
in the United States and did not have the benefit of FDII. The tax liability is 80 percent of what 
the firm would pay if it located the investment in the United States and availed itself of the FDII 
benefit on account of the relative percentage of income subject to U.S. tax under the two cases 
(i.e., 50% versus 62.5%).   
Ignoring any non-tax costs for now, the firm’s after-tax cash flows from the investment 
as well as the IRR and NPV of the investment corresponding to each location choice are shown 
in Table 5. 
Table 5: After-Tax Cash Flows, NPV and IRR from Intangible Investment (United States 
versus Overseas) 
 
70 In the situation where this assumption is not met – not an entirely unrealistic possibility – the U.S. tax 
treatment of the investment would be worse than that of a silent partner. The resulting U.S. tax liability under the 
GILTI provision would correspondingly be significantly higher and would lead to an outcome worse than when it 
chooses the United States as the investment location. 
71 Note that the rules on GILTI as well as those on FDII correctly isolate the economic rents in this example 
($4.8 million in present value terms). The capital allowance rules (i.e., immediate expensing) in both jurisdictions, 
and the way QBAI is computed for the investment in question allow the provisions to achieve this policy objective.  
72 I.R.C. § 250(a)(1)(B). 
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(All figures except percentages in million USD) 
 
The values for years 0 through 5 in column (R) in the table represent the difference between 
before-tax cash flows from column (G) in Table 1 and the total tax liability in column (M) from 
Table 3. Similarly, column (S) is the difference between column (G) in Table 1 and column (Q) 
in Table 4. The table shows that the firm’s after-tax IRR remains the same regardless of its 
investment location decision. In each case the U.S. government acts as a silent partner in the 
investment and leaves the normal return untaxed. The percentage of investment in which the 
U.S. government “silently” participates is greater and as such, the upfront cost to firm is 
correspondingly lower when the investment is located in the United States ($8.69 million versus 
$8.95 million). The subsequent gross returns are taxed more heavily when the investment is 
located in the United States as well with the result that the investment’s NPV is higher when it’s 
located overseas.  
The NPV analysis appears to confirm the view that the rules on FDII and GILTI do not 
adequately close the tax-arbitrage window for mobile capital.73 However, as discussed above, 
this may not represent a complete picture of the firm’s decision criteria were it to incur 
incremental non-tax costs when choosing to locate its mobile capital (e.g., IP) in the foreign 
jurisdiction (especially when tax arbitrage is the primary motivation for such a decision). Such 
transaction costs may come from having to locate the requisite economic substance – with such 
requisite level being higher in the post-BEPS world – away from what would be its optimal 
location in a world without tax considerations.74 Additional compliance and administering efforts 
(in a world with greater transparency and access to information by taxing authorities) will likely 
further contribute to such transaction costs. For the candidate investment in our example, a 
present value of such transaction costs greater than $127 thousand – the difference between the 
NPVs under the two alternative locations – over the life cycle of the investment is enough to tilt 
 
73 If the investment were subject to constant returns to scale, the firm could replicate the investment’s 
overseas NPV in the United States. It could do this by investing an amount that is higher in before-tax 
terms but that costs the firm the same on an after-tax basis as when it locates the investment overseas (i.e., 
$8.95 million).  
74 See discussion in Section III.D.  
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the balance back in favor of the United States as the favored investment location. This cutoff 
value for transaction costs amounts to 1.3 percent of the initial investment outlay and 1.7 percent 
of the NPV of the pre-tax gross returns (i.e., $2.4 million in the normal return plus $4.8 million 
in economic rents). Having to spend $127 thousand as a transaction cost when planning and 
locating an investment of $10 million in a tax-advantaged jurisdiction (which otherwise would 
not be the natural home of that investment) is not far-fetched.   
Since normal returns are left untaxed regardless of the location, the divergence in the 
after-tax NPV comes purely from the tax burden borne by the economic rents. Consequently, this 
divergence is greater (smaller) the higher (lower) the expected economic rents from the 
investment. Figure 1 shows the “indifference” threshold for transaction costs – expressed as a 
percentage of the pre-tax present value of gross returns – and how this threshold varies with the 
rate of economic rents given other assumptions on the investment profile. Given other 
parameters of our example, and allowing the rate of economic rents to vary between 0 percent 
and 50 percent, the curve in Figure 1 represent the level of transaction costs that make the U.S. 
MNC indifferent between the United States and the zero-tax foreign jurisdiction as its investment 
location.  
Figure 1: Indifference Curve for Investment Location – Non-Tax Transactions Costs 
versus Rate of Economic Rents 
 
For any combination of transaction costs and economic rents lying above the “indifference 
curve” in Figure 1, the United States is the preferred location of the investment while the zero-
tax foreign jurisdiction is the preferred location for transaction cost-economic rent combinations 
that lie below the curve. The indifference curve itself shifts downwards – increasing the space 
over which the United States is the preferred investment location – as the foreign tax rate rises 
above zero. For a foreign tax rate equal to 13.125 percent, the indifference curve for the 
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candidate investment in our example will coincide with the horizontal axis.75 Thus, for a range of 
investment profiles, the rules on GILTI and FDII might leave little or no tax-rate arbitrage 
opportunity when non-tax transactions costs over the investment’s life cycle are fully 
incorporated in the firm’s cost-benefit calculus. In particular, new investments with extremely 
(and possibly, implausibly) high rates of expected economic rents would be the suitable 
candidates for offshoring to low-tax jurisdictions. Other things equal, large scale investments 
might also be suitable candidates for offshoring. Non-tax transaction costs may exhibit some 
economies of scale and, in absolute terms, may be lower than the “indifference threshold” for 
extremely large investments with high expected rents. 
C. Tangible Capital 
Turning now to the location choice for new investments in tangible capital, the 
combination of the GILTI and FDII rules may provide a motivation for firms to locate tangible 
property overseas. 76  First, 10 percent of QBAI (the tax basis in such tangible property) is 
removed from FDII, thereby lowering the tax benefit afforded by the FDII deduction. Second, 
and in the same vein, 10 percent of QBAI held overseas reduces GILTI and thereby reduces the 
tax’s deterrent impact.  
To analyze a U.S. MNC’s location choice with regard to new investments in tangible 
capital we start with the same investment profile as shown in Table 1 but which is now assumed 
to apply to a tangible investment. The assumption of such high economic rents may seem 
implausible in the context of tangible capital. However, since the perceived benefit from 
offshoring tangible capital comes from such rents being shielded from U.S. tax by the 10 percent 
return on QBAI (as well as by enhancing the FDII benefit), the assumption of high rents to 
tangible capital allows us to evaluate the accuracy of that claim in the situation where it would be 
most likely to hold.77  
Overseas jurisdictions that are likely candidate locations for tangible capital, such as 
factories, are unlikely to offer close to zero tax rates. Unlike the analysis above for intangible 
investments, the foreign tax rate assumed in this section is 8.5 percent. Our thinking behind this 
assumption is that the firm will be constrained to retain – for income tax purposes – at a 
minimum, the normal rate of return in the jurisdiction that houses the physical capital. We take 
the OECD average corporate tax rate of approximately 25 percent applying to this part of the 
income that will be reported in the candidate location of the tangible capital.78 We assume an 
effective tax rate of zero on the economic rents as the best outcome the firm can effectively 
achieve by separating its location from that of the physical capital assuming it satisfies the types 
of post-BEPS considerations and constraints described in the previous section.79 The assumed 
 
75 To reiterate, this ignores Section 904 limitations.  
76 Kamin et al., supra note 7. 
77 Readers may interpret the assumption as capturing the rate of economic rents in the overall system and 
not necessarily tied, or attributable to, the tangible system. The overall quantum of rents under such an interpretation 
bears a relationship to the scale of the tangible investment via the overall scale of operations.  
78 Corporate Tax Rates Around the World 2018, Daniel Bunn, Fiscal Fact 623, TAX FOUND., 
https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-tax-rates-around-world-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Z7BX-4L5E]. 
79 See discussions in Section III.D. 
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foreign tax rate of 8.5 percent on the total income generated from the investment when located 
overseas represents a rounded approximation of the weighted average tax rate on the normal 
return and the economic rents.  
An important consideration with regard to investments in tangible capital is the expensing 
rules of section 168(k), as amended by section 13201 of the TJCA. For investments in certain 
forms of tangible capital made within the United States between 2018 and 2022, expensing 
means that the tax treatment of the investment is given by column (H) in Table 2.80 In contrast, 
the tax rules of most jurisdictions allow only a depreciation deduction for investments in tangible 
capital.81 The tax treatment of the investment when located in a foreign jurisdiction is given by 
column (I) of Table 2. Note further, that the QBAI in each period, as determined under the 
section 168(g) alternative depreciation schedule, is assumed to correspond to the actual 
economic net capital stock shown in column (A) of Table 1.  
Following the same order of analysis as before, if the firm locates this investment in the 
United States and benefits from the FDII rules, its total tax liability in years 0 through 5 is shown 
in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Total Tax Liability when Locating Tangible Investment in the United States 
(All figures in million USD) 
 
The figures in Table 6 are derived in the same manner as those in Table 3. The difference 
between the tables starts with the amount of taxable income that constitutes FDII with the 
ensuing difference flowing through to the FDII benefit and total tax liability (inclusive of the 
FDII benefit). In Table 6, the FDII is lower in periods 1 through 5 by 10 percent of the QBAI 
(which is now positive in each of these periods under the ADS). Unlike the example of the 
intangible investment, the combination of expensing and the form of the investment generates 
QBAI means that the FDII rule does not accurately identify and isolate economic rents. The 
portion of the income that is identified as FDII ($2.4 million in present value terms) in the 
 
80 Our focus on an investment that qualifies entirely for the new expensing rules under the TCJA is 
admittedly a restrictive one. More realistic situations will have only a portion of an investment in a tangible asset – 
e.g., a manufacturing plant – as qualifying for expensing.  
81 Pomerleau, supra note 29, at 2.  
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example falls short of the full extent of the economic rents ($4.8 million) because of the 
subtraction of the normal return ($2.4 million) ascribed to tangible capital from this pool of 
income. The 37.5 percent FDII deduction is only a mixed blessing in this case where expensing 
applies to investments in tangible capital. While the provision exempts 37.5 percent of the 
economic rents from U.S. tax, it puts 37.5 percent of the normal return back under the burden of 
the tax which otherwise would be exempt on account of the expensing provision. In our example, 
the net effect of the FDII deduction is still beneficial given the relative magnitude of the assumed 
rents. However, as these rents decline to zero, the firm would actually be better off not availing 
of the FDII provision so as to not dilute the benefit of expensing.82 We surmise that this may be 
an unintended design flaw in the provision and stems from a failure to correctly identify (in 
concept) the economic rents as the rightful target for the deduction.   
When the firm instead locates the tangible investment in the foreign jurisdiction, and under the 
assumption that the local tax rules of the foreign jurisdiction do not allow for immediate 
expensing, taxable income is zero in the year the investment is made. Neither government does 
anything to defray the cost of the investment in year 0. Given our assumed best case scenario for 
the firm, the foreign tax is limited to a weighted average rate of 8.5 percent in every subsequent 
year and the foreign tax liability is shown in column (Y) in Table 7.83   
The U.S. government imposes a tax on 50 percent of the taxable income in years from 1 
through 5. However, because the taxable income in each year excludes depreciation (on account 
of the local capital allowance rules) as well as the normal return (via the 10 percent of QBAI 
exclusion), tax is imposed only on a portion of the economic rents.84 Therefore, even in the case 
of tangible investments, the GILTI rules result in the U.S. taxing no more than the economic 
rents, although that result is achieved via a different route than in the case of intangible 
investments. In this case, the U.S. also provides a credit for 80 percent of the firm’s foreign tax 
liability.85 The end result is that the firm’s U.S. tax liability under GILTI is lower both in present 
value and undiscounted terms than in the intangible investment case analyzed previously.  
 
82 Note that with lower rents, the firm’s incentive to offshore the investment in pursuit of a lower tax rate 
also diminishes.  
83 Comparing the foreign tax liability in column (Y) from Table 7 with the regular U.S. liability in column 
(J) from Table 3 shows the benefit of expensing. The assumed foreign tax rate is only 40 percent of the U.S. tax rate 
yet yields a tax liability that is just over 60 percent of the regular U.S. tax liability (before the FDII benefit) in 
present value terms. 
84 The computation of the GILTI amount subject to U.S. tax starts with an after-tax amount (i.e., the “net 
CFC tested income”) from which the imputed return on QBAI is deducted. The final GILTI amount subject to U.S. 
tax is a before-tax figure via the section 78 gross-up. The mechanics of this computation – especially the sequencing 
with regard to the subtraction of the imputed return on QBAI – mean that the non-zero foreign tax rates of the 
provision falls just short of isolating the full extent of the economic rents.  
85 We assume that no limitations (e.g., from expense allocation) apply to the foreign tax credits. The 
allocation of expenses under the rules of I.R.C. §861 can limit the foreign tax credit and thereby subject some 
foreign income to U.S. tax even when the CFCs foreign tax rate exceeds 13.125 percent.  See Sullivan, supra note 
53. In the context of this analysis, such limitations would increase the U.S. tax on GILTI and make the foreign 
jurisdiction less favorable, other things equal.  
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Table 7: Total Tax Liability when Locating Tangible Investment Overseas86 
(All figures in million USD) 
 
Analogous to the analysis for the intangible investment, the firm’s after-tax cash flows from the 
tangible investment and the IRR and NPV of the investment are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: After-Tax Cash Flows, NPV and IRR from Tangible Investment (United States 
versus Overseas) 
(All figures except percentages in million USD) 
  
The expensing and the FDII rules – each of them working only imperfectly with the investment 
characteristics assumed in our example – combine to provide a better expected after-tax IRR for 
the firm when it locates the tangible investment in the United States versus overseas in the 
hypothesized candidate foreign jurisdiction. The firm does marginally better from locating the 
investment overseas in terms of the after-tax NPV of the investment – even though the upfront 
after-tax outlay is higher, the subsequent returns face a lower tax burden. However, this benefit 
in terms of NPV is small – approximately $38 thousand on a $10 million investment and barely 
 
86 The amount shown in column (Z) is after the section 78 gross-up (i.e., the amount subject to US tax 
under the GILTI provision).  
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half a percent of the pre-tax NPV of gross returns. Furthermore, the benefit declines rapidly as 
the expected rate of economic rents in the system decline with the balance shifting in favor of the 
United States for low rates of rents. All of this suggests that the location of tangible capital is 
likely to be dictated much more by non-tax factors (such as cost/supply of labor, supply-chain 
considerations, etc.) and the new provisions, by themselves, are unlikely to significantly 
disadvantage the United States as a location for such investment.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The new GILTI and FDII rules have attracted widespread attention. In this paper, we 
analyze whether these rules help retain internationally mobile rents within the U.S. tax base and 
the associated economic activity within the United States. We compare investments with the 
same before-tax profiles in terms of their after-tax IRR and NPV when made in the United States 
versus when made abroad. Our analysis suggests that for a wide range of investment profiles 
(characterized in terms of size and expected above-normal returns) for intangible capital, a U.S. 
MNC can do better by locating the investment in the United States. When non-tax transaction 
costs are incorporated in the firm’s cost-benefit calculus, the FDII rules provide a significant 
incentive for U.S. firms to locate new investments within the U.S. and the GILTI rules impose a 
significant-enough burden (by way of U.S. tax) such that a firm’s NPV from an investment is 
greater when locating such an investment within the U.S. than in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, our analysis also suggests that the rules, by themselves, do not dilute the above 
outcome by providing any significant incentive to locate new tangible capital outside of the 
United States. Our conclusions differ from other commentators’ claim that the GILTI and FDII 
rules do not provide sufficient incentives for firms to locate investments within the US and even 
have the opposite effect for some investments. An important reason for the difference in our 
conclusions comes from our explicit consideration of non-tax transactions costs of tax planning 
in the post-BEPS global environment and our departure from a single-period perspective in favor 
of the entire life cycle of the investment.  
Our analysis relies on a simplified and stylized framework and several caveats are 
applicable. We ignore state taxes in the interest of simplicity but also on account of the 
uncertainty around what path the states are likely to take with regard to the rules on GILTI and 
FDII. We note however, that incorporating U.S. state taxes in the analysis would likely increase 
a U.S. multinational’s tax burden on its new investment in either location. By effectively 
assuming away foreign taxes in the case of intangible investments, we remove the issue of 
foreign tax credits that come into play with regard to the U.S. tax on GILTI. Relaxing this 
assumption is unlikely to alter the direction of our conclusions because it would make a foreign 
jurisdiction even less attractive relative to the United States. We ignore the impact of the new 
provision under section 59A on the base erosion and anti-abuse tax, which may make the 
overseas jurisdiction more unfavorable as an investment location choice.  Finally, we ignore risk; 
as noted above, the government is a true silent partner only if it offers perfect loss offsets. Under 
the changes made to section 172 by section 13302 of the TJCA, the loss offset provisions for the 
U.S. are less generous than before and less generous than in many other jurisdictions. The loss 
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offset restrictions are likely to erode some of the benefits of locating a new risky investment in 
the United States.  
Despite the caveats, the analysis in this article suggests that when looking at the expected 
after-tax returns from a new investment over its entire life cycle and accounting for non-tax 
transactional costs, the threat of GILTI and the allure of FDII may combine to make the United 
States a more attractive location of rent-generating investment than might first appear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
